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INTRODUCTION
Peruvian authorities arrested Lori Berenson in 1995 for leading the
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement ("MRTA") in its thwarted
plot to attack Peru's Congress.1 A "hooded" military tribunal found

1. See Lucien 0. Chavin, Rights Court Ruling Awaited on American Jailed in
Peru, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2004, at A19 (characterizing the MRTA as a rebel
group), available at 2004 WL 82780814; see also Jonathan Levi & Liz Mineo, The
Lori Berenson Papers, THE NATION, Aug. 24, 2000 (reporting that Peruvian
officials did not just arrest Berenson for her affiliation with MRTA, but for
organizing
the
attempted
attack),
available
at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20000904&s=levi (last visited Feb. 20,
2005).

2005]

LORI BERENSON CASE

869

her guilty of treason and sentenced her to life imprisonment.2 Largely
in response to international outcry, Peru annulled the life sentence 3
and moved the case to a civilian court, which subsequently tried
'4
Berenson for the lesser charge of "cooperation with terrorism.
Despite her claim of innocence, the civilian court convicted
Berenson and sentenced her to twenty years in prison.' Since she
exhausted all of her domestic remedies, Berenson's claim that Peru
violated her human rights became ripe to go before the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights ("Inter-American Court").6

2. See Annual Report 2002, Inter-Amer. C.H.R., para. 331 [hereinafter
Annual Report 2002] (describing the charge as "treason against the fatherland"
at
available
judges"),
"faceless
before
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/chap.3m.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
3. See Press Release, Supreme Council of Military Justice, Berensons Counter
Peru's Response to Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Press
Release] (declaring a lack of jurisdiction over Berenson's case and thus annulling
at
available
conviction),
treason
her
http://www.freelori.org/gov/peruvian/faqwith-rebuttals.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2005).
4. See Harris Whitbeck, Guilty Verdict in Berenson Case, CNN LAW CENTER,
June 21, 2001 (attributing the annulment of the military court's judgment to thenpresident Alberto Fujimori's desire to clean up his image after the public learned
election), available at
rigging the previous presidential
of his
http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/20/berenson.bigp/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2005);
see also Harris Whitbeck, Verdict Looming in Berenson Case, CNN LAW CENTER,
June 20, 2001 (indicating that Peru was further compelled to overturn the treason
conviction by human rights groups and foreign governments), at
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/20/berenson.context/index.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2005).
5. See Patricia A. Morisette, Note, The Lori Berenson Case: Proper
Treatment of a Foreign Terrorist Under the Peruvian CriminalJustice System, 26
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 81, 94-95 (2002) (noting that in addition to the
prison sentence, the court fined Berenson the equivalent of U.S. $28,000). The
prosecution had requested, but the court denied, the maximum sentence of thirty
years. Id.
6. See American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, art. 46(1)(a),
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 155 [hereinafter American
Convention] (allowing only those cases in which the alleged victim has exhausted
all of his or her domestic remedies in accordance with established international law
to come before the Commission). But see Dinah Shelton, The Jurisprudenceof the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 333, 344
(1994) (arguing that the Inter-American Court applies the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine far less stringently than other human rights systems).
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When the Inter-American Court ruled in the Berenson case in
November 2004, it correctly found that Peru only failed to comply
with one article of the American Convention on Human Rights
("American Convention"),7 but its reasoning was at times either
inconsistent with prior case law or inadequate to justify its
conclusions. 8 Part I of this Note discusses aspects of the American
Convention, Peru's legal system, and the Inter-American Court's
jurisprudence that pertain to the Berenson case. 9 It also reviews the
facts surrounding Berenson's arrest, Peruvian trials, and proceedings
before the Inter-American Court.' 0 Part II explains how some of the
Inter-American Court's reasoning was flawed, incomplete, or both,
and provides alternative legal justifications for the conclusions it
reached." Part III recommends that the Inter-American Court
articulate a narrow exclusionary rule, 2 devise a more precise
definition of the term "cause" for the purpose of its double jeopardy
jurisprudence, 3 and limit the scope of the prohibition on ex post

7. See Berenson Case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2004, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 119, paras. 109, 128, 210 (2004) (ruling Peru only violated Berenson's
right to humane treatment under Article 5, but not her right to a fair trial under
Article 8 or her right to be free from ex post facto laws under Article 9), available
at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/l19-esp.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2005).
8. See discussion infra Part II (determining that the Inter-American Court's
analysis of the alleged Articles 8 and 9 violations were largely unpersuasive or
contradictory).
9. See discussion infra Part I (limiting the background information to that
which is necessary to follow the arguments and recommendations in Parts II and
III).
10. See discussion infra Part I (providing the factual and legal background to
Berenson's claim as well as Peru's defense).
11. See discussion infra Part II (drawing on the Inter-American Court's case
law in providing the support for the arguments that were absent in Berenson).
12. See discussion infra Part III.A (arguing that the Inter-American Court
should give the plain meaning to the text of Article 8(3) in order to avoid some of
the potentially disastrous consequences of leaving the exclusionary rule wide open
in scope).
13. See discussion infra Part III.B (pointing out the lack of a clear explanation
of what it means to try someone for the same "cause").
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facto laws, 4 all in order to better inform States' Parties of their
obligations under the American Convention. 5

I. BACKGROUND
A. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS
1. History
In 1969, the Organization of American States ("OAS") adopted
the American Convention, a legally binding human rights
instrument. 6 To ensure the substantive rights that it set forth, the
Convention re-established the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights ("Commission") and created the Inter-American
Court.'7 The Commission decides petitions, drafts country reports,
and until 2001, has been the sole advocate for the alleged victims
before the Inter-American Court.' 8 The Inter-American Court issues

14. See discussion infra Part III.C (suggesting that the Inter-American Court
limit the scope of Article 9 to its plain language).
15. See discussion infra Parts III.A-C (asking the Inter-American Court to help
Peru in its attempt to comply with the American Convention).
16. See American Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. (memorializing the desire
of the American States signatory to the Convention to bind themselves to the
instrument, and thus to recognize the "essential rights of man"). See generally Jo
M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing
Precedentsand Procedurein Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
297, 304-06 (1995) (providing historical background on the formation of the OAS
and the creation of the American Convention).
17. See American Convention, supra note 6, arts. 33-73 (laying out the InterAmerican Court and Commission's functions and procedural rules).
18. See Christine M. Cerna, The Inter-American System for the Protection of
Human Rights, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 195, 197-98 (2004) (characterizing the
Commission's practical role as a "court of first instance" despite the fact that the
two organs are supposed to be equally authoritative). Cema, as a lawyer for the
Inter-American Commission, prepares decisions on petitions and visits countries to
produce reports on their human rights situations. Id. at 198-99. The Commission's
main function has changed in the past several years from providing country reports
to deciding petitions and advocating for alleged victims. Id.
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advisory opinions, as well as binding decisions, on whether State
Parties violated the American Convention. 9
2. Relevant Provisions of the American Convention

Article 9 of the American Convention protects individuals from ex
post facto laws, but the Inter-American Court has interpreted it to
also prohibit State Parties from imposing imprecise laws or laws that
are overly similar.2" Article 8 protects the right to a fair trial,
including the right to an expeditious trial before an independent and

competent court, 1 the right to a presumption of innocence,22 and the

19. See Shelton, supra note 6, at 338 (describing the Inter-American Court's
role as interpreting the Convention in contentious cases but also as interpreting
other treaties as well as the Convention for disputes arising among countries who
have not ratified the Convention). For the States' Parties who have ratified the
Convention, the rulings in contentious cases that the Inter-American Court makes
are binding and final on all parties to the dispute. Id.; see also Cema, supra note
18, at 198-99 (explaining that the Inter-American Court did not start deciding
contentious cases until ten years after it came into existence).
20. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 9 (mandating that "no one
shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal offense,
under the applicable law, at the time it was committed"). Article 9 also precludes
countries from imposing greater criminal penalties than those applicable at the
time of the crime's commission. Id. If, after the commission of a crime, the law
reduces the penalty for that crime, the country must apply the lighter punishment to
those that the country previously convicted for that crime. Id. The Inter-American
Court extended Article 9 to bar vague or ambiguous laws. Id; see also Castillo
Petruzzi et al. Case, Judgment of May 30, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.
52, para. 121 (1999) (holding that vague laws violate the principle of nullum
crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia, which means an act is not criminal without
there being a previously existing law making it a crime), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/52-ing.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
21. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8(1) (mandating that State
Parties provide speedy trials, before a court that the law has already recognized, for
those accused of crimes as well as for individuals engaged in civil litigation); see
also Baena Ricardo et al. Case, Judgment of Feb. 2, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 72, para. 125 (2001) (reiterating the fact that the Article 8(1) fair trial
requirement applies to criminal, labor, civil, fiscal, or any other type of case),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/72-ing.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2005).
22. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8(2) (identifying the right to
presumption of innocence in the first part of the Article, before listing various
subsidiary rights in separate sub-sections).
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right to sufficient time and means for a defense. 23 Article 8(4)
ensures that after the State acquits an individual, it may not retry that
person for the same cause.24
B. PERUVIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PENAL SYSTEMS
In 1992, responding to the prevalence of terrorism in Peru, most
infamously the activities of the Shining Path25 and MRTA, President
Alberto Fujimori enacted various decree laws.26 The first of these
was Decree Law 25.475, which defined the crime of terrorism and
"cooperation with terrorism. '27 Decree Law 25.659 defined the crime
of "treason against the fatherland," an aggravated form of terrorism,
over which a military tribunal has jurisdiction.28 Since judges would

23. See id. art. 8(2)(c) (ensuring that defendants not only have enough time to
prepare a defense but the means as well).
24. See id. art. 8(4) (lacking any specific information on what constitutes the
"same cause"); see also discussion infra Part III.B (suggesting that the "same
cause" may be equivalent to the "same facts and a similar crime," but that the
Inter-American Court should further clarify the meaning of the phrase for the
benefit of State Parties).
25. See Shawn Choy, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL) (Center for
Defense Information, July 1, 2002) (summarizing the history of Shining Path's
activities, including, according to U.S. State Deptment estimates, the killing of
at
1980),
since
people
30,000
=
http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfmn?DocumentID=877&StartRow 1&List
Rows = 10&appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated%20deSC&programlD=3
9&IssueID=O&Issue=&DateFrom=&Date To=02/27/2005&Keywords=&Conten
tType=&Author=79&frompage=documents.cfm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
26. See RALPH RUEBNER ET AL., THE WAR ON TERRORISM: PERU'S PAST AND
PRESENT, A LEGAL ANALYSIS 3 (2004) (explaining that President Fujimori
restructured the Peruvian Government in order to enact the decree laws), available
at http://www.jmls.edu/pdf/perureport.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
27. See Decree Law 25.475, arts. 2, 4, May 6, 1992 (Peru) (defining terrorism
as creating a state of fear and alarm in the public or performing acts against life,
safety, property, security of buildings, roads, and modes of communication by the
use of arms, explosives or other means that seriously affect national security). An
individual is guilty of cooperation with terrorism when he aids in the acts
mentioned in Article 2, or when he takes part in the type of acts listed in the
statute. Id.; see also infra note 144 and accompanying text (listing the categories of
activities that constitute cooperation with terrorism).
28. See Decree Law 25.659, art. 1, Aug. 13, 1992 (Peru) (codifying treason as
the commission of the acts that constitute terrorism under Decree Law 25.475
which a person commits using car bombs, weapons of war, or explosives, and
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often be lenient on terrorism suspects because they feared for their
safety, 29 the new laws mandated that magistrates presiding over

terrorism and treason cases remain anonymous."

In 1997, Peru

discontinued the use of hooded judges in terrorism and treason
cases 31 and in 2003, Peru's Constitutional Court ruled that Decree
Law 25.659 was unconstitutional.32

which causes death, injury, property damage, or poses any other grave dangers to
the public).
29. See Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Civil and Political Rights,
Including Question of Torture and Detention [hereinafter Torture and Detention],
U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., para. 66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/63/Add.2 (1999)
(discussing the Peruvian Government's claim that terrorists assassinated several
judges
between
1983
and
1994),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/2fbc 128ab04eeec 1802567320037
971f'?Opendocument (last visited Feb. 20, 2005); see also American Convicted of
Terrorist Ties [to] Peruvian Guerillas, THE DAILY TEXAN, June 21, 2001

(describing Peru's explanation of the anonymity of judges in treason cases to
protect
them
from
rebel
reprisals),
available
at
http://tspweb02.tsp.utexas.edu/webarchive/06-21-01/2001062103_s03_Lori.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
30. See Decree Law 25.475, art. 15 (allowing the judges' secrecy of identity
through all stages of trial and for the opinions to go unsigned to further protect the
magistrates' anonymity); see also Torture and Detention, supra note 29, paras. 6667 (explaining that in practice, the judges would not only hide their faces, but
would also use voice distorters, which were often hard for defendants to
understand). The report gives an anecdote involving Margarita Chiquiure, who
could only hear noise coming from the voice distorters during her trial, at the end
of which the military tribunal sentenced her to twenty years in prison. Id.
31. See Torture and Detention, supra note 29, para. 65 (expressing approval at
the government's repeal of this practice, which was originally scheduled to expire
two years earlier).
32. See Amicus Curiae Brief Before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, presented by Gil Barragan Romero (unpublished) (discussing the case of
Marcelino Tineo Silva, in the Constitutional Court of Peru which led ultimately to
the
invalidation
of
the
decree
law),
available
at
http://www.freelori.org/statements/04may-amicuscuriae.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2005); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 2004: PERU (noting the

Constitutional Tribunal's ruling and the executive's response in amending the
relevant anti-terrorism decree laws to conform with the ruling), at
http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/per-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
Amnesty International is still concerned, however, that Decree Law 25.475 is
problematic from a human rights perspective because it is too vague. Id. It does,
however, approve of Peru's reduction in maximum jail sentences from life to thirty
years. Id. See generally RUEBNER ET AL., supra note 26, at 10, 20 (noting that the
Constitutional Court also found certain provisions of Decree Law 25.475
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C. JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT

1. The Loayza Tamayo Case
In 1993, Peru's Counterterrorism Bureau ("DINCOTE") arrested
Maria Elena Loayza Tamayo for collaborating with the Shining
Path.33 DINCOTE officials held Tamayo incommunicado for ten
days while they physically abused her in an attempt to get her to
confess to criminal activity.34 The state prosecuted Tamayo for
treason under Decree Law 25.659 and the hooded Special Naval
35
Court Martial convicted her on April 2, 1993. In August of that
year, the Special Tribunal of the Supreme Council of Military Justice
acquitted Tamayo of treason and ordered that civilian courts try her
for terrorism under Decree Law 25.475.36
unconstitutional but upheld the admissibility of repentant terrorists' affidavits,
enacting new legislation-Decree Law 922-which permits the use of evidence
that the state previously used in terrorism trials under the 1992 laws). Ruebner
reasoned that the sections of Decree Law 25.475 that the Constitutional Court held
unconstitutional either conflicted with the Peruvian Constitution or violated the
American Convention. Id. at 10. For example, the Constitutional Court held the
practice of submitting criminal cases against civilian defendants to military
jurisdiction unconstitutional, primarily as a violation of the Peruvian Constitution,
although it also conflicted with Castillo Petruzzi et al. Id. at 49. Furthermore, in
regard to evidence, the Constitutional Court emphasized that even where evidence
may be flawed, it does not necessarily indicate that the basis upon which
authorities gathered the evidence was flawed. Id. at 20.
33. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 33, para. 3(a) (1997) (explaining that her arrest was the result of the
accusation of another suspected terrorist who availed herself of Peruvian Decree
Law 25.499, known as the "Repentence Law," which allows for leniency against
at
available
terrorism),
prevent
help
who
those
21,
Nov.
visited
(last
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriec-ing/seriec-33_ing.doc
2004).
34. See id. paras. 46(c), 58 (establishing as proven, the facts that DINCOTE did
not allow the victim to speak with her family from February 6 to February 15,
1993 and that they mistreated her by immersing her in water and threatening her
with further violence).
35. See id. para. 3(e) (noting that the Special Naval Court had previously
acquitted Loayza Tamayo on March 5, 1993, before subsequently convicting her
on April 2, 1993); see also Cerna, supra note 18, at 206 (stating that both courts
tried the victim for the same crime based on identical facts).
36. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 3(e)
(characterizing the military court's action as an acquittal instead of an annulment).
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The Inter-American Court ruled in its judgment of September 17,
1997, that because the military tribunal ordered the civilian courts to
try Tamayo for terrorism despite lacking the jurisdiction to do so,
Peru violated Tamayo's right to trial by a competent court and her
right to a presumption of innocence.37 The Inter-American Court also
ordered Tamayo's release, in large part because the state subjected
her to double jeopardy, in violation of Article 8(4), by acquitting her
of treason and retrying her for the same cause.38

2. The Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case
A hooded Peruvian military tribunal convicted Jaime Francisco
Sebastian Castillo Petruzzi, and three other Chilean citizens living in
Peru, of treason under Decree Law 25.659. 39 The Inter-American
The distinction between annulment and acquittal becomes important in the double
jeopardy finding in the Loayza Tamayo case and the absence of double jeopardy in
the Berenson case. Id.; see also discussion infra Part II.D (explaining that the InterAmerican Court did not find that Peru subjected Berenson to double jeopardy since
the military tribunal annulled her conviction instead of acquitting her).
37. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 61
(criticizing the military tribunal's usurpation of power rightfully belonging to the
national police and to the civilian courts when the tribunal stated that there was
enough evidence to try the victim for terrorism). The Inter-American Court also
held that Peru violated Loayza Tamayo's right to humane treatment under Article 5
by unlawfully detaining and torturing her, relying in part on the European Court of
Human Rights' determination that psychological disturbance amounts to inhumane
treatment. Id. paras. 53-54. Additionally, Peru violated her right to personal liberty
under Article 7 when the military court detained her for two weeks after her
acquittal. Id. para. 57.
38. See id. para. 84 (granting the Inter-American Commission's request and
ordering Peru to release the victim to repair her rights that Peru violated, especially
her right to double jeopardy protection); see also Antonio Augusto Trindade,
Thoughts on Recent Developments in the Case-Law of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights: Selected Aspects, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 192, 199 (1998)
(raising the fact that the Loayza Tamayo case represented the first time that the
Inter-American Court ruled in a contentious case that a country's domestic laws
violated the American Convention). The Inter-American Court did not rule that an
individual law violated the Convention, however, but rather ruled that Decree
Laws 25.475 and 25.659, when taken together, lead to double jeopardy, in
violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Id.
39. See Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 52, paras.
86.9, 86.10 (describing the summary proceedings that the Chileans faced, as a
matter of protocol, after D1NCOTE made the determination that the state should
bring a treason charge instead of a terrorism charge).
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Court found that Peru's Decree Laws 25.475 and 25.659 are so
similar that the defendants could not have known in advance with
which crime the state might charge them, violating Article 9 of the

American Convention.

40

The Inter-American Court also held that Peru violated the civilian
victims' right to trial before a competent, independent, and impartial
4
court by trying them before a military tribunal. ' Furthermore, the
Inter-American Court ruled that Peru violated the Chileans' right to
notification of the charges against them, adequate time and means for
the preparation of a defense, choice of legal counsel, examination of
42
witnesses, appeal to a higher court, and a public trial.
As a result of its findings, the Inter-American Court ordered Peru
a civilian court in a manner that would
to retry the victims before
43
process.
ensure their due

40. See id. para. 119 (citing by analogy the Loayza Tamayo decision, where the
Inter-American Court held that the similarity of the two decree laws was a
violation of Article 8(4)).
41. See id. paras. 128, 130 (asserting that military tribunals do not meet the
standard of a "tribunal previously established by law for civilians," which Article
8(1) requires and that military tribunals are inherently impartial since the armed
forces are "fully engaged in the counter-insurgency struggle"); see also INTERAMERICAN

COMMISSION OF HUMAN

RIGHTS,

OAS,

SECOND

REPORT ON THE

para. 156 (2000) (pointing out that the
Inter-American Court decided to reach the issue of the military tribunal's
Tamayo), available at
impartiality in this case despite its failure to do so in Loayza
2
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Peru2000en/chapter b.htm (last visited Nov.
21, 2004).
42. See Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 52, paras.
141, 146, 153, 160, 172 (elucidating some of the actions that Peru took that led to
the violations, including "shackling" of the defense attorneys by denying them
access to evidence, allowing only a "peripheral role" for the victim-chosen
attorneys, disallowing cross-examination of witnesses, allowing cassation (appeal)
only for death penalty cases, and holding the trial on a military base, which the
public could not access). Based on their allegations, the Commission argued that
Peru violated the due process rights embodied in Articles 8(l), 8(2)(b), 8(2)(c),
8(2)(d), 8(2)(f), 8(2)(h), and 8(5). Id. Additionally, because DINCOTE held the
four Chileans incommunicado for an extended period of time, the Inter-American
Court declared that Peru violated Article 5. Id. para. 197.
43. See id. para. 226(13) (finding that the military trial of Jaime Francisco
Sebastian Castillo Petruzzi and his three compatriots did not meet the American
Convention's requirements). The Inter-American Court therefore ordered Peru to
amend its domestic laws that conflicted with the American Convention and to pay
SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERU
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D. THE HISTORY OF THE BERENSON CASE
As an anthropology student at MIT, Lori Berenson took an interest
in Latin American wealth distribution, visited El Salvador in 1988,
and subsequently took a job there in 1993." She moved to Peru in
late 1994 and rented a house in which MRTA members lived, but
whether she did so knowing of their involvement in the organization
is a matter of contention. 45 Based on the discovery of automatic
rifles, grenades, dynamite, and blueprints of Peru's Congress at her
Lima residence, Peruvian police arrested Berenson for organizing an
MRTA attack.46
A "faceless" military tribunal convicted Berenson of "Treason
against the Fatherland," a violation of Decree Law 25.659, during a
procedure under which the authorities did not inform Berenson of the
charges and did not allow her attorney to examine evidence or crossexamine witnesses. 47 The tribunal sentenced Berenson to the
maximum penalty of life imprisonment and another "faceless"
military appellate court dismissed Berenson's subsequent appeal. 48
U.S. $10,000 to the victims' next of kin. Id. paras. 222-23; see also Cema, supra
note 18, at 206 (describing how the retrial order led Peru to declare its withdrawal
from the Inter-American Court's jurisdiction).
44. See William J. Nottingham, Free Lori, INDIANAPOLIS PEACE AND JUST. J.,
Sept. 16, 2004, at 6 (explaining that Berenson's interest in Latin America went as
far back as 1988, when she visited El Salvador with a group of Quaker women),
available at http://www.freelori.org/news/04sepl6_peaceandjusticejoumal.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
45. Compare Morisette, supra note 5, at 26-27 (proffering that "the Peruvian
government maintains that Berenson knew she was living with MRTA terrorists
and she was aware of the nature of terrorist activities which took place in the
house"), with Chavin, supra note 1 (expressing Berenson's belief that the only
reason she remains incarcerated is that she is a political pawn and not a terrorist).
46. See Jack Gallo, Human Rights Policy or Hardball Politics? Why the United
States Should Press Peru to Extradite Lori Berensonfor a Fair Trial, 25 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 91, 97 (2001) (questioning whether the existence of
contraband in her home was enough to link Berenson to terrorist acts and the
MRTA).
47. See Annual Report 2002, supra note 2 (describing the facts put forward in
the Inter-American Commission's petition before the Inter-American Court).
48. See Morisette, supra note 5, at 93 (explaining that the military court
subjected Berenson to the standard procedures in handing down the sentence of life
imprisonment without parole); see also Annual Report 1998, Inter-Amer. C.H.R.,
paras. 3-4 [hereinafter Annual Report 1998] (establishing the fact that the Supreme
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Berenson served almost four years of her sentence at Yanamayo
Prison, at an elevation of 12,000 feet, causing her severe health
49
problems.
After notable human rights organizations denounced Peru's
treatment of Berenson, 5° an unfavorable Inter-American Commission
country report,5 and strong U.S. pressure, the Fujimori Government
annulled the military court's ruling and moved Berenson to a prison
2
with more moderate living conditions. In 2001, before a public
civilian trial, Berenson had the opportunity to examine the evidence
before her, cross-examine witnesses and other procedural safeguards
53
that she did not have at her military hearing. The court convicted
her of cooperation with terrorism, in violation of Article 4 of Decree

Military Court, also with "faceless" judges, upheld the lower military court's
sentence). Berenson's attorney filed another appeal, this time for review, but the
Court denied it in 1997. Id. at 4.
49. See Ranee K. L. Panjabee, Terror at the Emperor's Birthday Party: An
Analysis of the Hostage-Taking Incident at the Japanese Embassy in Lima, Peru,
16 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 37 (1997) (relating the concern Berenson's parents
expressed at their daughter's hands turning purple from the freezing temperatures
at Yanamayo Prison, which is located over 12,000 feet above sea level); see also
Gary Borg, American Gets Life Sentence as Rebel in Peru, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12,
1996, at 12 (referring to Yanamayo as one of the country's roughest prisons),
availableat 1996 WL 2633297.
50. See, e.g., Amnesty International Calls on Peru to Give Trial to Lori,
REUTERS, Apr. 10, 1998 (calling the 1996 military trial a "parody of justice"),
9
available at http://www.freelori.org/news/ 8aprIO reuters.html (last visited Nov.
21, 2004); see also Rhoda Berenson & Mark Berenson, "Human Rights Watch"
Condemns Peru's Anti-Terrorism Laws (demanding the amendment of Peru's
country convicted Berenson), at
"draconian" decree laws, under which the
2
2
(last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
1.html
mar
http://www.freelori.org/familyupdates/0
51. See infra note 57 and accompanying text (divulging findings from the
Commission's confidential ruling against Peru in 2002, but warning that the
information is not verified, since the report is not supposed to be available to the
public).
52. See Gallo, supra note 46, at 96 (raising the possibility that Berenson's
retrial was more likely a product of Fujimori's political motives than of any new
exculpatory evidence, as the ex-president claimed).
53. See Measured Support for Berenson, CBS NEWS, June 27, 2001 (quoting
U.S. State Deptartment Spokesman Philip Reeker as saying that the civilian trial
trial"), available at
did not contain the "most egregious flaws in the military
2
(last visited
98761.shtml
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/6/27/world/main
Mar. 10, 2005).
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Law 25.475, and sentenced her to twenty years in prison. 4 The
appellate court affirmed Berenson's conviction, thereby effectively
eliminating the last of her domestic remedies. 5
In December 1998, while Berenson was still serving her sentence
for treason, her lawyers filed a petition on her behalf before the InterAmerican Commission.16 In 2002, even after Peru moved Berenson's
case to a civilian court and reduced her sentence, the Commission
ruled that Peru violated Articles 8, 9, 5, 2 and 1(1) of the Convention
and petitioned the Inter-American Court to issue a ruling to that
effect.57 The Inter-American Court took the case, 8 hearing final
arguments in May 2004, and publicly issuing its ruling in
December.

9

54. See Annual Report 2002, supra note 2, para. 331 (specifying that the
civilian court found Berenson guilty of violating Articles 4(a) and (b) of Decree
Law 25.475).
55. See Craig Mauro, Peru Upholds 20-Year Sentence for American, CHICAGO
SuN-TIMEs, Feb. 19, 2002, at 27 (suggesting that a presidential pardon would be
Berenson's only other hope within Peru), availableat 2002 WL 6448278.
56. See Annual Report 1998, supra note 48, para. 6 (asking the Inter-American
Court to find that Peru violated Articles 5, 7, 8, and 25 of the American
Convention).
57. See Rhoda Berenson & Mark Berenson, News From Lori's Parents: Text of
the Ruling of the Inter-American Commission (summarizing the findings of the
Commission, including that both Decree Laws 25.475 and 25.659, under which
Peru prosecuted Berenson, are incompatible with the American Convention), at
http://www.freelori.org/familyupdates/02jul 17.html#iacruling (last visited Mar. 10,
2005). It is unknown whether this is what the official report actually says, since it
is kept confidential. Id," see also American Convention, supra note 6, art. 50(2)
(allowing the Commission, in the event that it cannot reach an agreement with the
state party, to issue a report of its findings to the country, "which shall not be at
liberty to publish it").
58. See Berenson Case, Order of the Court of Sept. 6, 2002, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. E) (2002) (formalizing its intent to hear the case by acknowledging that Peru
ratified the Convention on July 28, 1978, and is thus subject to the Court's
jurisdiction); see also Berenson Case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2004, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 6 (2004) (declaring the Inter-American Court's
competence to hear the case because Peru has been a signatory to the American
Convention since 1978).
59. See Rick Vecchio, Berenson 's Quest to Reverse Conviction Ends, New
Yorker Guilty of Collaboratingwith Marxist Guerillas Resigned to Serving Out
Last [Eleven] Years of Term, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 11, 2004, at 28A
(reporting that the Inter-American Court upheld Berenson's twenty-year sentence).
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The Inter-American Court held that the crime of "cooperation with
terrorism" is distinct from terrorism and thus the co-existence of the
60
two laws does not violate Article 9 of the American Convention. It
also held that Berenson did not face double jeopardy since she did
not technically face two "trials" and since the military tribunal did
not "acquit" her.6' Despite the Commission's assertions, the InterAmerican Court found that Peru's civilian court was independent and
impartial.6 2 Additionally, it found that the civilian trial respected
Berenson's right to adequate time and means for defense and the
presumption of innocence, 63 although it did not explain why.' Since
the Inter-American Court also held that Peru violated several

provisions of Article 8 as a result of Berenson's trial before a

military tribunal, and not resulting from the civilian trial, the Inter65
American Court refused to order Berenson's release. The InterAmerican Court did order Peru to pay damages, however, as a

consequence

of

Berenson's

imprisonment

under

hazardous

66

conditions and the incommunicado detention she faced.

60. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 127
(characterizing the crime of cooperation with terrorism as an autonomous crime
and not a class within the crime of terrorism).
61. See id. paras. 206, 208 (denying the existence of the military trial for
Article 8(4) purposes, in light of Article 8(1) violations, and asserting that the
military court merely declared that it lacked jurisdiction, without re-examining the
facts of the case).
62. See id. paras. 153-54 (refusing to address the neutrality of the judges
because Berenson did not sufficiently pursue the claim in the domestic courts, and
avoiding any response to the Commission's charge that there was an insufficient
separation between the civilian and military proceedings, and therefore a biased
civilian court).
63. See id. paras. 164, 169 (declaring that the evidence generally demonstrates
that Peru respected Berenson's right to presumption of innocence and her right to a
neutral judge).
64. See discussion infra Part II.B (providing some arguments for the InterAmerican Court's unsupported holdings).
65. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 210
(denying the appeal for freedom because Berenson's current incarceration is the
result of the civilian trial and not the military trial).
66. See id. paras. 109, 237-39 (ruling that Peru violated sections 1, 2, and 6 of
Article 5 and ordering the cancellation of the fine it imposed on Berenson as well
as additional damages to compensate Berenson's parents for their legal expenses).
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II. ANALYSIS
The Inter-American Court's holdings in Berenson are correct,
although in reaching some of them it employed reasoning that was
either flawed or incomplete. 67 While several of the Inter-American
Court's holdings are straightforward and need no expansion,6" this
section attempts to elucidate those defective holdings in Berenson
and provide further support, clarification, and explanation, where
needed.69
A.THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT APPLIED INCORRECT REASONING
WHILE REACHING THE PROPER CONCLUSION AS TO PERU'S
RESPECT FOR ARTICLE 8(1)
The Inter-American Court found that Peru respected Berenson's
Article 8(1) right to a neutral and competent judge during her civilian
trial, but it incorrectly blamed the military court for an insufficient
separation between the military and civilian proceedings.7" One of
the Commission's attacks against the civilian trial under Article 8(1)
was that there was not enough division between the military and
civilian jurisdictions' handling of Berenson's case. 7' Presumably, the

67. See discussion infra Part II (concurring in the judgment but reaching the
holdings via alternative routes).
68. See, e.g., Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, paras. 98109, 182-200, 211-48 (finding that Peru violated Berenson's Article 5 right to
humane treatment, but respected her Article 8(2)(f) right to interrogate witnesses,
her Article 8(2)(h) right to appeal, and her article 8(5) right to a public trial, among
other things).
69. See discussion infra Part II (observing several weaknesses in certain lines
of reasoning that the Inter-American Court employed despite ultimately reaching
the correct conclusion).
70. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, paras. 148-49
(holding the military court responsible for 8(1) violations due to the anonymity of
its judges but incorrectly finding violations for its usurpation of civilian court
jurisdiction).
71. See id. para. 129.2(a) (alleging there was no clear distinction between the
two trials). The Commission argued that the lack of a distinct separation resulted
from the fact that the evidence that the military court gathered had a role not only
in Berenson's civilian trial and ultimate conviction, but it was also what made the
civilian court pursue terrorism charges in the first place. Id. Since it was first
among the list of the Commission's complaints regarding the civilian trial, it may
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idea is that the civilian court could not have truly been neutral if its
proceedings were merely a continuation of the decidedly prejudiced
military process.72 The Inter-American Court agreed that there was
an insufficient separation between the proceedings, but that it was a
73
deficiency in the military, not the civilian, process.
The rationale behind the ruling was similar to that in Loayza
Tamayo, where the military tribunal acted beyond the scope of its
jurisdiction by recommending that the civilian courts pursue
terrorism charges.74 The Inter-American Court did not, however,
address the Commission's argument that the lack of adequate
separation also led to the civilian court's bias.75 In fact, it could not
address the Commission's argument because finding a lack of
seem to necessarily indicate
separation between the systems 7would
6
biased.
was
court
civilian
the
that
be safe to assume that this claim relates to Article 8(1)-the first provision of
Article 8 that the Inter-American Court addresses in its analysis. Id.
72. See Press Release, Council for Hemispheric Affairs, Peru Fights a Loser's
Battle in the Notorious Berenson Case (Aug. 8, 2002) (explaining that one of the
Commission's 2002 findings was that Peru unlawfully allowed the use of the
at
trial),
civilian
the
in
evidence
court's
military
http://www.coha.org/NEWPRESSRELEASES/NewPressReleases_2002/02.3
0_BerensonCase.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
73. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, paras. 148-49
(applying the same language to the military tribunal in Berenson as it did to the
military tribunal in Loayza Tamayo, despite the fact that the two cases were
factually quite different).
74. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 33, para. 61 (1997) (setting forth two ways that the military trial
improperly acted beyond its jurisdiction: by sending the case to the civilian
jurisdiction to try the defendant for terrorism and ordering that the civilian court
detain her).
75. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, paras. 151-56
(finding only that the civilian court respected Berenson's right to have her case
before a neutral judge). The Inter-American Court refused to rule on whether the
individual judges of the civilian court were neutral and impartial because Berenson
failed to raise the issue in Peruvian courts in a timely manner. Id. para. 153. The
Inter-American Court followed the United Nations Committee on Human Rights,
which allows countries a chance to respond to violations domestically before it will
rule on them. Id. para. 154.
76. See id. para. 129.2(a) (showing that the Commission's claim that there was
not enough separation between the two trials meant that the civilian trial violated
Article 8(1) as well).
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The real reason the Commission's claim against the civilian court
fails is the sufficient division between the civilian and military
courts, contrary to the assertions of the Inter-American Court.77 The
Inter-American Court decided in Loayza Tamayo that Peru's military
tribunal violated the victim's Article 8(1) rights by announcing that
there was sufficient evidence to send her case to the civilian courts to
try her for terrorism after it acquitted her of treason.78 The InterAmerican Court appeared to stress the fact that the civilian criminal
justice system did not conduct an independent investigation in
Loayza Tamayo's case; it simply accepted the case file and pursued
terrorism charges based solely on the military prosecutors'
investigation. 79 The Inter-American Court noted that in Berenson,
however, the civilian court conducted its own investigation 0 and that
it was not a violation for it to accept the military court's files."
In Loayza Tamayo, the Inter-American Court also highlighted the
fact that the military court declared in its annulment verdict that there
was enough evidence for terrorism charges.8 2 There is no such
language in the military court's annulment verdict in Berenson's

77. Compare Loayza Tamayo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33, para.

61 (noting that the military court announced that there was enough evidence to
charge Loayza Tamayo with terrorism), with Press Release, supra note 3

(announcing that the Council nullified Berenson's treason sentence and would
refrain from further hearing the case, sending the case file to the civilian court
system).
78. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 61

(noting the lack of jurisdiction with which the military tribunal declared the
existence of evidence for a terrorism charge, a determination that only the regular
courts have the authority to make).
79. See id. para. 46(i) (attributing the collection of evidence, with which both
courts tried Loayza Tamayo, to DINCOTE).
80. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 174 (noting
that officials collected enough evidence during the civilian trial to prove the
charges against Berenson).
81. See id. para. 208 (finding that the military court did not analyze the facts
when annulling the treason conviction and merely sent the files to civilian court).
82. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 61
(identifying the language that the military court used in its acquittal, which stated
there was "evidence of the commission of the crime of terrorism").
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case.83 It is likely that Peruvian officials read the Loayza Tamayo
opinion and specifically avoided "usurping" the civilian court's

84
jurisdiction once it decided to annul Berenson's treason conviction.

In Berenson, the evidence shows that the military court annulled the
verdict and took no further action, instantly allowing the civilian
s5
jurisdiction to independently pursue terrorism charges. For these
reasons, the civilian court maintained sufficient separation from the
military court and thus survived the Commission's allegation of
partiality. 86

B. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
BERENSON'S CIVILIAN TRIAL AFFORDED HER AN ADEQUATE
DEFENSE AND A PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, BUT ITS ANALYSIS
FAILED TO RECONCILE SOME APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS

In ruling that Peru respected Berenson's rights under Article
8(2)(c) during her civilian trial but not during her military trial, the
Inter-American Court's decision failed to adequately distinguish the
facts of the two trials. 7 For example, one of the reasons the military
trial violated Article 8(2)(c), according to the Inter-American Court,
was that Berenson's attorney only had access to the case file one day

83. See Press Release, supra note 3 (referring specifically to the legal standards
in effect-undoubtedly referring to the Loayza Tamayo Case-that required it to
cease any further action once it found that it lacked jurisdiction).
84. See id. (sending the procedural documents to the civilian courts after noting
that it only had jurisdiction over treason charges, for which there was insufficient
evidence).
85. See Geoffrey Mohan, A Reversal in Peru, New Yorker Still Jailed But Wins
New Trial, NEWSDAY, Aug. 29, 2000, at A08 (indicating that following the
annulment, the military court directed the case to the civilian court without delay),
availableat 2000 WL 10031066.
86. See discussion supra Part II.A (explaining that the Commission's charge of
bias in the civilian court resulting from any lack of a sufficient split between the
proceedings is unfounded due to the fact that the military and civilian courts
consciously kept their distance).
87. See, e.g., Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, paras.
130.2(n), 167 (identifying the fact that Berenson's attorney had one day to examine
the file before the military trial and four days to do so before the civilian trial).
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before the trial and two hours to study it.88 Meanwhile, the evidence
shows that authorities only notified Berenson of the terrorism
charges four days before her civilian trial,89 yet this trial complied
with 8(2)(c). 90 If one day is an insufficient amount of time to study a
2,000-page file, four days is not a great improvement, especially
since the file had imaginably grown larger by that point. 9'
The Inter-American Court likely considered the amount of time to
prepare a defense to be a small part of the Article 8(2)(c) calculus,
which also involves the means for a defense.92 The discrepancy
identified above diminishes upon examining the allowances for a
defense during the civilian trial as compared with the restrictions on
an adequate defense in the military trial. 93 At the civilian trial,
Berenson and her attorneys presented and examined evidence, crossexamined witnesses, and communicated freely and privately with
each other.94 Meanwhile, neither Berenson nor her attorney had any

88. See id. paras. 129.1(c), 167 (noting the Commission's argument that
Berenson's attorney had approximately two hours to study 2000 pages and that he
did not have the opportunity to discuss the case with Berenson confidentially).
89. See id. para. 130.2(n) (asserting that four days notice prior to the first
hearing was not enough time for Berenson and her attorney to prepare their
defense, especially considering that they were defending new criminal charges).
90. See Vecchio, supra note 59 (reporting that the Inter-American Court upheld
the validity of Berenson's civilian trial); see also U.S. Woman Must Serve Full
Sentence in Peru, Human Rights Court Decides, NAT'L POST, Dec. 4, 2004, at A17
(submitting that the ruling validated the civilian trial as comporting with human
rights standards, despite the assertion of several human rights organizations).
91. See Jude Webber, Lori Berenson Grilledfor Fifth Day, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 3, 2001 (presenting Berenson's parents' concern about the fairness of the
civilian trial in light of the fact that formal charges came only four days before
hearings began), available at http://www.freelori.org/news/0lapr03-ap.html (last
visited Feb. 8, 2005).
92. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8(2)(c) (requiring that States
ensure both adequate time and means for criminal defendants to prepare a
defense).
93. See Morisette, supra note 5, at 97-98 (explaining that the military trial's
lack of due process warranted the criticism it received while the criticism of the
civilian trial resulted largely from an expectation of similarity to the adversarial
criminal procedural system in place in the U.S.).
94. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, paras. 169-70
(ruling that Berenson's defense attorney was allowed to present evidence and
interrogate witnesses during both the investigative and oral phases of the trial).
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of these rights during the military trial.95 Additionally, while four
days may not be enough time for a defense attorney in an adversarial
criminal system to prepare for a case, in an inquisitorial system such
as Peru's, where the judge has a more active role than the attorneys,
four days is far more reasonable.96
Another example of apparent contradiction within the InterAmerican Court's analysis resulted from its failure to distinguish the
activities of the civilian and military courts with respect to
Berenson's presumption of innocence. 97 Specifically, the InterAmerican Court found that DINCOTE violated Article 8(2) by
presenting Berenson to the press as the perpetrator of treason during
the early stages of the military trial, but found no similar violation
where officials kept Berenson in a cell located in the courtroom
during the first day of her civilian trial. 9
To reconcile the apparent inconsistency, it again helps to
distinguish the U.S. criminal justice system, which utilizes juries in
deciding guilt or innocence, from Peru's inquisitorial system.99 The
former relies heavily on lay jurors to make determinations of fact
95. See id. para. 167 (concluding that based on the evidence, Berenson did not
have adequate time or means to prepare a defense; her lawyer's role was symbolic
more than anything).
96. See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal
Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 403, 416-17 (1992) (describing the typical
inquisitorial model as one where an active judge or judges are very familiar with
the case, control the case file, and ask far more questions of the witnesses than
either the prosecutor or defense attorney); see also Russel G. Pearce, Redressing
Inequality in the Marketfor Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the
Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
969, 971 (2004) (contrasting the inquisitorial system-where judges are experts
who "conduct investigations, initiate cases, determine the issues, and control the
presentation of evidence"-with the adversarial system, where the lawyers are
"placed at the center of the search for justice").
97. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, paras. 162-64
(making no mention of the facts of the civilian trial before holding that the civilian
court presumed Berenson innocent in accordance with Article 8(2)).
98. See id. paras. 158, 162 (finding that DINCOTE violated Berenson's rights
by showing her to the press before her conviction and then referring to the fact that
Berenson's representatives claimed that the civilian court also violated her right to
a presumption of innocence).
99. See Van Kessel, supra note 96, at 406 (stating that the United States
conducts ninety percent of the world's criminal jury trials).
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based on the parties' presentation of evidence, while the latter
generally leaves the fact finding to the judges, who play a very active
role throughout the trial.'00 Whereas a jury would likely be biased by
seeing a defendant behind bars in the courtroom, there is little reason
to fear that civil law judges would be similarly biased, especially
when detaining defendants is a matter of protocol.' 0 ' Moreover, after
Berenson's protests, the court allowed her to stand outside of the cell
for the rest of the lengthy proceedings, perhaps demonstrating to the
Inter-American Court a lack of any real injury. 10 2 By comparison,
DINCOTE's actions directly affected Berenson's right to a
presumption of innocence and did cause injury, by swaying Peruvian
public sentiment against her.0 3
C. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON
THE VALIDITY OF THE EVIDENCE THAT BERENSON'S CIVILIAN
TRIAL USED

The Inter-American Court acted beyond the scope of its
jurisdiction by analyzing the evidence in Berenson's civilian trial,
10 4
and in the process established an overly broad exclusionary rule.
100. See Pearce, supra note 96, at 971 (comparing the role of the judge in a civil
law inquisitorial system with the role of a jury in an adversarial common law
system).
101. Cf Van Kessel, supra note 96, at 460-62 (discussing how important voire
dire and peremptory challenges are in the U.S. adversarial system, where jurors are
dismissed-or selected, depending on the case-largely for their potential
prejudices).
102. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 130.2(d)
(laying out Berenson's argument that being caged for the first day and guarded by
four soldiers demonstrated a presumption of guilt). Berenson's representatives also
complained that after the cage episode, the press called her the MRTA terrorist or
the gringa terrorist. Id.
103. See Rick Vecchio, Peru Prisoner Not Hopeful; World Court Ruling
Probably Won't Get Her Out New Yorker Says, AKRON BEACON J., Oct. 7, 2004, at
13 (recounting that Peruvians saw Berenson on television for the first time after
her arrest, where Fujimori referred to her as a terrorist leader of the MRTA),
available at 2004 WL 56292853. Vecchio also commented that Berenson's
television appearance-where she appeared angry and agitated-left such an
indelible image on the minds of Peruvians that Berenson believed it would be the
reason Peru would never reduce her prison sentence. Id.
104. Compare American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8(3) (providing only that
coerced confessions shall be invalid), with Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
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Although the American Convention is silent on the issue of
evidence, 0 5 the Inter-American Court chose to discuss the

admissibility of evidence that the civilian court received from the
military court."0 6 It proclaimed that the evidence originating in the

military proceedings was not admissible in the civilian trial,
presumably because the military court obtained the evidence in a
manner that violated a number of Berenson's human rights. 0
However, without specifying which evidence was inadmissible and

which American Convention violations rendered the evidence
invalid, the Inter-American Court appeared to hold that an
investigation that violates any human rights renders all evidence
gathered during that investigation invalid. 108
The American Convention only requires the exclusion of coerced

confessions, 0 9 and since Berenson never made a confession, there
was no reason to discuss evidence exclusion at all."0 Regardless, the
Inter-American Court, whether intentionally or not, created an
extremely broad exclusionary rule, which is problematic for two
reasons."' First, a strict exclusionary rule is inconsistent with the
(Ser. C) No. 119, para. 174 (declaring the evidence that the military court collected
inadmissible in the civilian trial).
105. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8 (avoiding any mention of
evidentiary requirements within the article that ensures the right to a fair trial). The
American Convention only uses the term "evidence" once in its entire text, in an
article dealing with evidence before the Inter-American Court, not domestic courts.
Id. art. 48.
106. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 172
(addressing the methods by which the civilian court gathered evidence to use
against Berenson).
107. See id. paras. 171, 174 (remarking on the military trial's deficiencies
regarding its means of proof and discounting the validity of such proof in civilian
court).
108. See id. (finding that despite the inadmissibility of evidence from the
military trial, the civilian court still had ample means of proving Berenson's guilt).
109. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8(3) (invalidating confessions
of guilt that result from "coercion of any kind").
110. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 214
(declining to rule on the allegation that Peru violated Articles 7 and 11 because
Berenson's attorneys failed to include it in the complaint and therefore was not
properly before the Inter-American Court).
111. See id. para. 174 (committing only one sentence of the opinion to the
finding that the evidence from the military trial was invalid). Despite the brevity of
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principles of an inquisitorial system of criminal justice, which is

arguably aimed more at uncovering the truth than adversary
systems." 2 Second, excluding all evidence originating in military
courts could make it extremely difficult for Peru to retry those whom
it previously convicted of treason, potentially requiring the release of
known terrorists back into society." 3
D. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
JUSTIFY ITS RULING THAT PERU DID NOT COMMIT DOUBLE
JEOPARDY

In supporting its ruling that Berenson did not face double
jeopardy, the Inter-American Court employed two arguments, the
first of which directly conflicted with Loayza Tamayo."4 The first
the statement, it may have enormous consequences, potentially opening the flood
gates for criminals to suppress a wide range of evidence. Id.; see also discussion
infra Part III.A (warning of the threat that overactive exclusionary rules pose).
112. See Van Kessel, supra note 96, at 420 (warning that "a trial system ...
which.., imposes draconian exclusionary rules of evidence, would not be a great
legal engine for discovering the truth"). Van Kessel also discusses how
inquisitorial systems place a greater emphasis on discovering the truth than do
adversarial systems. Id. at 451 n. 196. He further notes that the zeal with which the
United States employs the exclusionary rule evidences its sacrifice of truth in favor
of other objectives. Id.
113. See Torture and Detention, supra note 29, para. 61 (estimating that Peru
tried more than 1200 civilians before military tribunals); see also Harry M.
Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice
Blacknun's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of ChangingJudicial Understanding
About its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 50 (1994)
(describing a U.S. judge's characterization of the exclusionary rule's effect as
"punish[ing] vigorous police work while it frees criminals"). But see Yale
Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 119, 131-32 (2003) (pointing to the fact that murderers, rapists, and
other serious criminals seldom win motions to suppress evidence and thus seldom
go free). Kamisar also notes the ability of the judge to find ways around excluding
evidence when the evidence strongly supports conviction of a dangerous felon. Id.
at 132.
114. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 206
(pronouncing that the violation of Berenson's right to a competent and independent
judge meant that the military proceeding was not a genuine process); see also
Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.
33, para. 77 (1997) (finding double jeopardy in Loayza Tamayo's case, implying
that the military tribunal was a genuine process, despite its violation of Loayza
Tamayo's right to a competent and independent judge).
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argument was presumably that Berenson's proceeding before the
military court was so devoid of due process that it was not really a
"trial," and so Peru did not commit double jeopardy, which requires
two trials." 5 The Inter-American Court, however, found virtually the

same due process violations in Berenson's military proceedings as it
6
did in Loayza Tamayo's military proceedings." Since it found

double jeopardy in Loayza Tamayo's case, it must have meant that
she faced two "trials"-one in the military court and one in the
civilian court." 7 If Loayza Tamayo's military proceeding was a
"trial," then it must follow that Berenson's military proceeding was
' 18
also a "trial." "
The Inter-American Court's second argument successfully refuted
the Commission's allegation that the military trial ended in an
"acquittal," although it should have further supported its
conclusion." 9 The Commission argued that the military and civilian
courts tried Berenson for the same cause, the former having acquitted
2 0 Instead,
her of treason based on an examination of the evidence.
the Inter-American Court explained that the proceedings before the
military jurisdiction ended in an annulment due to lack of

115. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 206
(denying military proceedings are genuine processes for Article 8(4) purposes).
116. Compare id. para. 150 (borrowing the exact language it used in Loayza
Tamayo, to declare that the military tribunal "acted ultra vires [and] usurped
jurisdiction," in violation of Article 8(1)), with Loayza Tamayo Case, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 61 (concluding that by performing functions over
which the civilian court had exclusive jurisdiction, the military court violated
Loayza Tamayo's right to a competent judge).
117. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8(4) (prohibiting States'
Parties from acquitting individuals and then subjecting them to a "new trial,"
indicating that the acquittal came during the old trial) (emphasis added).
118. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 206
(including no explanation for why Berenson's military process was not genuine
while Loayza Tamayo's was, despite the overwhelming similarity between the
two).
119. See id. para. 208 (stating only that Berenson's proceedings before the
military court ended in a ruling declaring that jurisdiction over the case was
properly with the civilian courts).
120. See id. para. 129. 1(k) (arguing that despite using the term 'annulment,' the
military court actually acquitted Berenson because it examined the facts of the
case).
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jurisdiction.1 2 ' This reasoning is consistent with Loayza Tamayo, a
case that the Inter-American Court could have used to strengthen its
holding in Berenson.122 In Loayza Tamayo, the Inter-American Court
emphasized the fact that Peru's military tribunal could have, but did
not, "relinquish" the case for lack of jurisdiction. 2 1 Instead, the
military tribunal used the term "acquittal.'

' 24

The Inter-American

Court made this terminological distinction in 1997 and Peru
presumably took note, specifically refraining from using the term
"acquit" in annulling the military tribunal conviction
and sending
Berenson's case to the civilian court system in 2000.125 While the
distinction is largely semantic, it is one that the Inter-American Court
uses, and thus it followed precedent in finding that double jeopardy
26
did not exist in Berenson.1
Furthermore, unlike in Loayza Tamayo, Peru's legal system did
not retry Berenson for the same "cause"; the military court convicted
121. See id. paras. 208-09 (holding that the military court did not rule on the
facts when annulling Berenson's conviction and sending the case to the civilian
court).
122. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 70
(deciding that if the military court wished to declare a lack of jurisdiction over the
case, then it should have stated as much, and not used the term "acquit," which
implies a judgment based on the facts).
123. See id. para. 71 (emphasizing that the Special Naval Court Martial had used
the term "relinquish" in regard to other accused individuals, along with whom it
tried Loayza Tamayo, and that "if the judicial intention had been to restrict its
ruling to a matter of no jurisdiction, it would have used the same term when
referring to Ms. Maria Elena Loayza Tamayo").
124. See id. para. 76 (deciding that "the military court, instead of declaring itself
to lack jurisdiction, took cognizance of the facts, circumstances and evidence
relating to the alleged acts, evaluated them, and ruled to acquit her") (emphasis
added).
125. See Press Release, supra note 3 (declaring the military's limitation of
jurisdiction only over treason cases and thus taking no further action after
nullifying Berenson's treason conviction); see also Annual Report 2002, supra
note 2, para. 331 (indicating that the military court "annulled" the treason
conviction as opposed to acquitting Berenson).
126. Compare Loayza Tamayo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33, para.
71 (noting that the military tribunal often uses the term "relinquish" to describe its
annulment of a decision which it did not have jurisdiction to issue, while the
tribunal in Loayza Tamayo's case specifically used the term "acquit"), with Press
Release, supra note 3 (nullifying Berenson's treason conviction-a move whose
motive is more along the lines of relinquishment for lack of jurisdiction).
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her of leading the MRTA and the civilian court convicted her of
merely assisting it, based on new facts. 127 In Loayza Tamayo, the
Inter-American Court was careful to distinguish the use of the term
"cause" in the American Convention from the use of the term
"crime" in other human rights instruments, the latter being more
narrow and encompassing fewer cases.' 28 It found double jeopardy
even though Peru technically charged Loayza Tamayo with two
different crimes. 129 This is because the two crimes were very similar
and because Peruvian authorities based both charges on the same set
of facts. 130 This is distinguishable from Berenson in two ways. First,
the two crimes with which Peru charged Berenson were less similar
than the two crimes with which Peru charged Loayza Tamayo.' 3 '
Second, while both of Loayza Tamayo's trials relied on the same
facts, the civilian court based Berenson's conviction on its own
investigation, which produced a new set of facts.'3 2 Thus, an element

127. See Gallo, supra note 46, at 96 (characterizing the new exculpatory
evidence announced by the Fujimori government as supporting the claim that
Berenson did not actually participate in the plot to attack the Peruvian Congress).
128. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 66
(contrasting the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Art. 14(7), which uses as a standard the "same crime," with the American
Convention's use of the "same cause" standard).
129. See id. paras. 4(a), (e) (noting that after the military court acquitted Loayza
Tamayo of treason, she still had not yet exhausted her domestic remedies because
the civilian court had not finished prosecuting her for terrorism).
130. See id. (indicating that a comparative reading of certain articles of Decree
Laws 25.659 and 25.475 demonstrates just how similar the two laws are).
131. See discussion infra Part II.E (padding the Inter-American Court's
argument that Peruvian law did not violate the Article 9 prohibition on ex post
facto laws because cooperation with terrorism is a distinct crime and not a class
within the crime of terrorism).
132. See Berenson Case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2004, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 119, para. 172 (2004) (identifying the methods of investigation that the
civilian court conducted, including the collection of documentary evidence from
different organizations, testimony from more than thirty witnesses, and expert
reports). The Inter-American Court went on to find that the evidence that the
civilian court system collected was enough, in and of itself, to prove Berenson's
guilt. Id. para. 174.
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necessary for a double jeopardy finding was missing, according to
133
the facts in Berenson.

It was also necessary for the Inter-American Court not to find
double jeopardy in Berenson in order to maintain consistency with
Castillo Petruzzi et al.134 Because the military trial violated Castillo
Petruzzi and the other Chileans' rights under the American
Convention, the Inter-American Court ordered that Peru retry the
victims before a civilian court. 135 By ordering this remedy, the InterAmerican Court essentially pre-approved the legality of similar
retrials in the future.136 Finding that there was double jeopardy in
Berenson would have amounted to punishing Peru for its attempt to
comply with the precedent that Castillo Petruzzi et al. set.137
E. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PERU
DID NOT VIOLATE THE ARTICLE 9 PROHIBITION AGAINST Ex POST
FACTO LAWS, BUT COULD HAVE USED ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS
IN SUPPORT OF ITS CONCLUSION

The Inter-American Court held that the crime of cooperation with
terrorism is not similar enough to the crime of terrorism to amount to
a violation of Article 9 but did not take advantage of another, equally

133. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8(4) (requiring two trials for

the same "cause" in order to prove that the State committed double jeopardy).

134. See Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Judgment of May 30, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 52, para. 226 (1999) (ordering the victims' retrial after holding
that their military trial violated the American Convention).
135. See id. para. 221 (rendering the military trial invalid for lack of due process
and thus requiring Peru to provide a new trial that will include sufficient rights
under the American Convention).
136. See id. (holding that military trials of the sort the Chileans underwent
necessarily lack due process and that Peru can remedy such a case by sending it to
the civilian courts).
137. See Interview by Amy Goodman with Mark Berenson, Co-Director,
Committee to Free Lori Berenson (May 10, 2004) (observing Peru's argument
before the Court as appealing to the fact that Peru has been "moving towards
democracy" by repealing its condemned Treason Decree Law 25.659), availableat
http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=04/05/10/1418209 (last visited May
18, 2005).
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forceful argument.13 8 According to the Inter-American Court, a
13 9 The most
country can violate Article 9 in two different ways.
obvious application of Article 9 is to prevent countries from

criminally convicting their citizens for acts that the law did not
140 The Interidentify as criminal at the time of their commission.
American Court extended the application of Article 9 to also prevent

countries from enacting laws that are overly vague, on the theory that
such laws do not allow individuals to know whether their actions are
"
14
criminal, or the severity of the penalty. ' On this theory, Peru
violated Article 9 when it concurrently enforced Decree Laws 25.475

and 25.659, which are so similar that authorities could bring either
charge. 42 However, the Inter-American Court reasoned that
43 This
cooperation with terrorism is not overly similar to terrorism.

138. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 127 (relying
on the fact that Peruvian law distinguished the crime of cooperation with terrorism
from the crime of terrorism enough to make them separate crimes, despite their
both being located in the same decree law).
139. See, e.g., Baena Ricardo et al. Case, Judgment of Feb. 2, 2001, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 72, para. 115 (2001) (finding that Panama's Law 25 violated
Article 9 of the American Convention by allowing the retroactive enforcement of
the law against 270 employees that the government arbitrarily dismissed); Castillo
Petruzzi et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 52, para. 121 (deciding that
Article 9 extends to prohibit vague laws and laws that are overly similar to one
another).
140. See Richard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The Inter-American Human Rights
System: Activities From Late 2000 Through October 2002, 18 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 651, 679 (2003) (pointing out that the Inter-American Court's finding that
implementation of retroactive criminal laws violated Article 9 is not as expected as
it might seem at first blush to Americans, considering the fact that such laws are
commonplace in much of the world).
141. See Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 52, para.
121 (expounding the rule that in order for the principle of nullum crimen nulla
poena sine lege praevia to have force, criminal laws must not be vague or
ambiguous in their description of what constitutes criminal activity).
142. Compare Decree Law 25.475, art. 2 (defining the crime of terrorism as the
creation of a state of public alarm or performing actions against human life, safety,
or property, by the use of arms, explosives or other means that threaten national
security), with Decree Law 25.659, art. 1 (classifying treason as the use of car
bombs, weapons of war, or explosives in the commission of the acts that constitute
terrorism, under Article 2 of Decree Law 25.475).
143. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 127
(differentiating the actions of the terrorist from that of the individual who
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is analogous to the establishment of laws penalizing conspiracy as a
distinct offense, a practice that goes unquestioned in other OAS

Member States.' 44 Moreover, the Peruvian legislature included in the
criminal statute examples of activities that would constitute
cooperation with terrorism, allowing individuals to know if their
actions fall under terrorism or cooperation with terrorism.' 45

Another reason that Peru did not violate Article 9 of the American
Convention is that Berenson did not suffer any injury resulting from
the existence of allegedly similar laws. 14 6 In Castillo Petruzzi et al.,
the Inter-American Court claimed that the similarity between

terrorism and treason was prejudicial to the defendants because the
State had the discretion to pursue the more serious charge.'4 7

Specifically, in Castillo Petruzzi's case, the more serious charge
meant military jurisdiction, a summary trial, and a longer sentence.14

cooperates with terrorism, the latter performing certain enumerated acts which help
the former).
144. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 2005) (subjecting anyone who conspires
to commit any crime against the United States to criminal penalties under this
section, regardless of whether the individual actually committed the crime);
Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46 § 465 (1985) (Can.) (establishing in a separate
section of the Canadian Federal Statutes the penalties for the various crimes of
conspiracy). Although Canada generally imposes the same maximum prison
sentence for conspiracy as for the offenses toward which the defendant has
conspired, the crime nonetheless appears in a separate section. Id.
145. See Decree Law 25.475, art. 4(a)-(f), May 6, 1992 (Peru) (identifying the
following six categories of behavior that constitute cooperation with terrorism: (a)
providing documents and information about people, buildings, or other things to
facilitate terrorist activities; (b) giving away or using housing to hide people or
store weapons or other supplies belonging to terrorists; (c) consciously moving
people to help facilitate terrorism or to help them escape; (d) training terrorists; (e)
acquiring, storing or supplying weapons or explosives; and, (f) funding terrorist
activities).
146. See Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 52, para.
119 (claiming that it was injurious to the Chilean defendants for Peru to have
similar laws that imposed different penalties and subjected defendants to two
different proceedings, one far more fair than the other).
147. See id. (noting that both charges referred to actions not strictly defined so
that they could be interpreted similarly).
148. See id. (pointing out that under Peruvian law in place at the time, if the
State chose to charge the defendant with the more serious offense, his case would
face a "summary proceeding"). The Inter-American Court also noted that the more
serious offense meant "fewer guarantees," referring to the gross lack of due
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Even if terrorism and cooperation with terrorism are similar and the
State could have charged Berenson with either, she would have faced
the same civilian court and the same twenty-year minimum sentence
for either charge. 149 This lack of injury should have provided the
Inter-American Court with additional grounds for finding that Peru
observed Article 9.150

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT SHOULD LIMIT THE APPLICATION
OF ITS EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO ONLY PRECLUDE COERCED
CONFESSIONS FROM ENTERING INTO EVIDENCE

In Berenson, the Inter-American Court effectively established a
broad exclusionary rule, but it should narrow its scope to match the
5
ordinary meaning of Article 8(3) of the American Convention. ' The
Inter-American Court found that all the evidence that the military
investigation produced was inadmissible in the civilian trial, without
distinguishing between evidence that authorities collected legally and
52
evidence they collected in violation of the American Convention.'
It also failed to explain which American Convention violations
rendered the evidence invalid.' 53 The Inter-American Court thus

process that the Inter-American Court identified in Peruvian military trials,
especially of civilians. Id. paras. 127-32.
149. See Decree Law 25.475, arts. 2, 4 (requiring those guilty of either terrorism
or cooperation with terrorism to serve "no less than twenty years"). But see
Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 111 (h) (arguing that the
imposition of the same sentence for terrorism and cooperation with terrorism
amounts to an over punishment in violation of the principle of proportionality).
150. See discussion supra Part III.E (reasoning that injury was a weighty
consideration in finding a violation of Article 9 in Castillo Petruzzi et al.).
151. See Berenson Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 174
(declaring the evidence that originated in the military investigation to be
inadmissible).
152. See id. (leaving out any qualifications to the statement that the militaryobtained evidence is inadmissible).
153. See id. (failing to explain the precise reason for the inadmissibility of the
military trial's evidence). Elsewhere in the opinion, the Inter-American Court lays
out some of the Commission's arguments about the invalidity of evidence,
including the fact that the military judge illegally directed the investigations,
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implicitly adopted a broad exclusionary rule, precluding States'
Parties from using any evidence that they obtained in a proceeding
where they violated any human rights.1 4
It is possible that the Inter-American Court did not intend to
establish such a broad exclusionary rule. However, having done
exactly that, it now needs to re-establish the limits that the American
Convention set.'55 The plain language of Article 8(3) requires the
exclusion of confessions that the State acquired by means of any
kind of coercion. 15 6 In some respects this is broader and in some
respects it is narrower than human rights instruments that require the
exclusion of statements resulting from torture.' 57 On the one hand,
Article 8(3) applies to any form of coercion-not just torture, but on
the other hand it does not apply to all statements; it only applies to
confessions.'58 By clearly setting these limits on the exclusionary
rule, the Inter-American Court will allow States' Parties-most of
which use the inquisitorial system-to better discover the truth. 15 9
This is especially important for Peru, which is attempting to retry
officials illegally searched Berenson's home, and DINCOTE coerced witnesses
into giving testimony. Id. para. 129. 1(d)-(f).
154. See id. (stating only that Peru was not allowed to use the evidence that the
military court obtained in the civilian trial).
155. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8(3) (requiring only that
States' Parties disallow coerced confessions).
156. See id. (dictating that "a confession of guilty by the accused shall be valid
only if it is made without coercion of any kind"); see also discussion infra Part
III.C (noting that the Inter-American Court abides by certain principles of the
Vienna Convention, such as positing the words of a treaty with their ordinary
meaning).
157. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 15, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N.

GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (requiring States'
Parties to ensure that courts do not allow statements into evidence if they establish
that the statement was a result of torture); Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S. Treaty Ser. No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519, art. 10
(using virtually the same language as the UN's torture convention).
158. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8(3) (restricting the American
Convention's exclusionary rule to confessions, but expanding it to any form of
coercion).
159. See supra notes 104-113 and accompanying text (explaining how the
exclusionary rule can frustrate the objective of truth, which is why inquisitorial
criminal systems use it far more sparingly than adversarial systems do).
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civilians whom it unlawfully subjected to military tribunals. 60 If the
Inter-American Court intends to require the broad exclusion of
evidence, it may force Peru to release a number of potentially
dangerous criminals. 6'
B. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM SHOULD MAKE ITS DOUBLE
JEOPARDY STANDARD MORE PRECISE

The OAS should amend the American Convention's definition of
double jeopardy, set forth in Article 8(4) to explicitly define the term
"cause,"
or the Inter-American
Court should do so by
1 62
All of the double jeopardy jurisprudence originates
interpretation.
which reads in its entirety: "an accused person
provision,
this
from
acquitted by a nonappealable judgment shall not be subjected to a
new trial for the same cause. ' 163 The Inter-American Court, in
essence, defined "acquittal" as a judgment based on the facts of the
case that exculpates the defendant 64 However, prior rulings do not
adequately inform States' Parties what it means to retry someone for
the same "cause. 1 65 The Inter-American Court, in Loayza Tamayo,
its first double jeopardy ruling, admitted that the term "cause" is very
66
It may be reasonable to
broad and works to the victim's advantage.
infer, based on the Inter-American Court's jurisprudence, that to
retry someone for the same "cause" is to retry someone for a similar

160. See Torture and Detention, supra note 29, para. 61 (calculating that
Peruvian military tribunals tried over 1200 civilians since 1992, many of whom
Peru is in the process of retrying).
161. See supra notes 104-113 and accompanying text (providing some common
critiques and defenses of the exclusionary rule).
162. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8(4) (defining double
jeopardy, in part, as a retrial for the same "cause").
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 76 (1997) (ruling that Loayza Tamayo faced double
jeopardy in virtue of the military court's review of the facts, which constituted an
acquittal).
165. See id. para. 67 (offering only that the crimes with which Peru tried Loayza
Tamayo were "closely linked" to each other).
166. See id. para. 66 (distinguishing the language in the American Convention
from the language that the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights utilizes).
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crime based on the same facts. 6 7 However, without an explicit
standard Peru will have difficulty determining under what
circumstances it can retry the hundreds of prisoners it convicted
under Decree Law 25.659. 168
C. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT SHOULD RESTRICT ITS OVERLY
BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ARTICLE 9 PROHIBITION AGAINST
Ex POST FACTO LAWS

The Inter-American Court should narrow the interpretation of
Article 9, which currently prohibits far more than the American
Convention drafters intended. Drawing on Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention, the Inter-American Court has tried to give terms their
ordinary meaning in the context of the American Convention when
interpreting its provisions. 169 The ordinary meaning of the language
in Article 9 suggests three principles: (1) the State may not prosecute
for acts that were not criminal when the individual committed them;
(2) the State may not impose a heavier penalty than the one
applicable at the time of the crime's commission; and (3) if the law
reduces the penalty for a certain crime, the State must accordingly
reduce the sentence of those who it already convicted of that
crime. 7 ° The Inter-American Court, through its case law, has
extended the reach of Article 9 to include actions by States' Parties

167. See id. paras. 66-67 (holding that Article 8(4) protects "individuals who
have been tried for specific facts" from facing retrial of those facts and noting that
although Peru charged the defendant with two crimes, they were similar enough to
form the same cause).
168. See Torture and Detention, supra note 29, para. 61 (referring to the military
courts' sentencing of 707 civilians since 1992). At the time of the report there were
an additional 567 civilians still on trial before the military courts. Id.
169. See John Maull, The Exclusion of Coerced Confessions and the Regulation
of Custodial Interrogation Under the American Convention on Human Rights, 32
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 87, 101 (1994) (explaining that the Vienna Convention
standard of giving the ordinary meaning to the terms of the treaty is binding on the
Inter-American Court's interpretation of the American Convention).
170. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 9 (lacking any prohibitions on
vagueness or similarity among pieces of legislation); see also supra note 20 and
accompanying text (articulating the three explicit mandates within the text of
Article 9).
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that clearly do not fall under any of these principles. 7 ' For example,
it established in Castillo Petruzzi et al., and affirmed in Berenson,

the principle that vague laws and similar laws are Article 9
violations. 7 2 It purported to defend this interpretation on the basis
that vague and similar laws allow the government too much
discretion in deciding whether to bring charges and which charges to
' The problem with its justification is that it is an overly
bring. "73
vague requirement of States Parties and therefore undermines their
sovereignty by giving the Inter-American Court the discretion over

which

domestic

laws

are

acceptable

and

which

ones

are

similar. 7 4

The Inter-American Court should
impermissibly vague or
leave domestic legislation in the hands of the States' Parties
wherever possible, and restrict its actions to interpreting the ordinary
language of the American Convention. 7 5

CONCLUSION
Lori Berenson's supporters claim that governments should not be
able to implement anti-terrorism measures that violate an

171. See, e.g., Richard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The Inter-American Human
Rights System: Activities During 1999 Through October 2000, 16 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 315, 322 (2001) (summarizing the Inter-American Court's Castillo Petruzzi
et al. ruling that terrorism and treason were "not sufficiently distinguishable to
satisfy the principle of legality").
172. See Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 52, para.
121 (stretching the protection against ex post facto laws to similarly prohibit
ambiguous laws); see also Berenson Case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2004, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 119, para. 125 (2004) (repeating that Article 9 requires a
clear definition of the illegal conduct-a rule that the Inter-American Court
constructed).
173. See Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 52, para.
121 (suggesting that indistinguishable laws will present the "opportunity for abuse
of power").
174. Cf id. (cautioning of the dangers of vague domestic laws, but ignoring the
possibility of vague international law or of the Inter-American Court's opportunity
to abuse its power). This interpretation does find support in other human rights
instruments, however, and is commonly referred to as the "principle of legality."
Id.
175. See Maull, supra note 169, at 101 (discussing the Inter-American Court's
self-imposed duty to interpret the American Convention in accordance with the
Vienna Convention's standards of interpretation, which aim to give the words their
usual and ordinary meaning).
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individual's guarantees of due process. 176 Peru, by retrying Lori
Berenson in a civilian court, and by annulling its unfair antiterrorism law, has shown that it agrees with Berenson's supporters, at
least to some degree.' 7 The Inter-American Court recognized this by
upholding Berenson's sentence,'78 but it should have taken more care
to employ sound reasoning and fully justify all of its conclusions, 79
especially in light of the scrutiny with which a high-profile case such
as this one will receive. 8 '

176. See Annual Report 2002, supra note 2, para. 333 (acknowledging the InterAmerican Commission's request that the Inter-American Court order Peru to
amend the offending Decree Laws to make them compatible with the guarantees in
the American Convention, despite their effectiveness at reducing terrorism).
177. See RUEBNER ET AL., supra note 26, at 11 (explaining that the
Constitutional Court of Peru cited the Inter-American Court's decision in the
Castillo Petruzzi et al. case in finding Decree Law 25.659 unconstitutional).
178. See Vecchio, supra note 59 (announcing that the Inter-American Court
upheld the sentence that Peru's civilian court handed down).
179. See discussion supra Parts II.A-E (criticizing numerous flaws in the InterAmerican Court's reasoning, and identifying arguments for which it gave no
justification at all).
180. See Chavin, supra note 1 (reporting on the anticipation of the InterAmerican Court's decision).

